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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature 0f the Case
This appeal arises from the District Court’s dismissal oprpellant Victor Bliss’s (hereafter
“B1iss”) claims

0n summary judgment. This case concerns numerous

Respondent Minidoka

Irrigation District (hereafter

“MID”) of varied conduct over the course 0f

several decades relating to Bliss’s status as a water user.

motion for summary judgment arguing
the Idaho Tort Claims

that Bliss

had

At

the close 0f discovery,

of

prima facie case for any 0f his claims, and that
he had not pled any actual right in

controversy. After the parties had full opportunity t0 brief and argue

Court granted summary judgment and dismissed

all

MID’S motion,

the District

0f Bliss’s claims.

appeals t0 this Court, seeking reversal 0n the District Court’s grant 0f summary

judgment. The District Court appropriately dismissed Bliss’s claims for several reasons.
Bliss failed t0 ﬁle adequate Notice of Tort

trespass,

ﬁled a

failed t0 satisfy the notice requirements

Bliss’s claim for declaratory relief was not justiciable because

now

MID

Act by not ﬁling a requisite Notice of Tort Claim 0n the claims made within

his Complaint, that Bliss could not establish a

Bliss

allegations against

Claim

and intentional inﬂiction of emotional

t0 support a primafacie case for

for his claims for breach

distress.

0f ﬁduciary duty,

Second, Bliss failed t0 provide evidence

any of his claims. Lastly, Bliss

controversy for his claim for declaratory

First,

failed t0 identify a justiciable

relief.

Course 0f Proceedings
Appellant Victor Bliss ﬁled an unveriﬁed complaint against the Respondent Minidoka
Irrigation District

on or about April
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17,

2017 requesting an award of damages

relating to claims for

breach of ﬁduciary duty, trespass, wrongful prosecution, intentional inﬂiction of emotional
distress,

t0

and breach 0f contract, as well as declaratory

Complaint and

liability

on

relief. (R.

Demand for Jury Trial and Counterclaim on

Bliss’s claims

pp. 10-16)

0r about

Summary Judgment 0n March
summary judgment

District Court,

May 22,

ﬁled

its

Answer

2017, denying

and alleging counterclaims for trespass and declaratory relief relating

encroachments placed by Bliss 0n MID’s right-of—way. (R. pp. 21-32).

for

MID

6,

2018. (R. pp.

(R. pp. 64-394),

and

1

oral

17-1 18).

The

to

MID ﬁled its Motion for

parties fully briefed

MID’s motion

argument on MID’s motion was heard before the

Hon. Michael Tribe presiding, 0n April 23, 2018 and was taken under advisement.

(R. pp. 395-396).

On June

concerns that he was

18,

named

2018, Judge Tribe commented t0 the parties

as a potential witness

by

at a status

conference

Bliss in his discovery responses, and he

ultimately entered an Order disqualifying himself in this matter. (R. pp. 404-406).

Hon. John K. Butler was assigned
10,

to this case

0n June 27, 2018.

2018, the District Court entered an Order Re: Motion for

Advisement indicating

that the parties agreed that

ofthe oral argument 0n MID’s Motion for
the pending motion. (R. pp. 409-410).

Motion

for

(R. pp. 407-408).

On July

Summary Judgment Under

Judge Butler could

listen t0 the digital recording

Summary Judgment in lieu ofrescheduling a hearing 0n

The

District

Summary Judgment 0n August 6,

Court entered

its

Memorandum Decision Re:

2018, granting summaryjudgment 0n Bliss’s claims,

denying summary judgment 0n MID’s counterclaims, and remanding MID’s counterclaims to

MID to be heard in later administrative hearings.
same day dismissing

(R. pp. 41 1-439)

A judgment was issued the

Bliss’s claims in their entirety. (R. pp. 440-442)
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On

September

14, 2018, Bliss

District Court’s granting

ﬁled his Notice 0f Appeal, indicating his challenge of the

of summary judgment and

its

dismissal of Bliss’s claims in their entirety

(R. pp. 443-446.)

Statement of Facts
A. Nature 0f MID’s Operations
Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District

Code

§

43-101

et seq.

an irrigation

district

formed pursuant

to

Idaho

MID is a taxing district Which delivers irrigation water t0 the properties of

landowning members of the

district. (R. p. 96).

assessments collected once a year on
their property. (Id.).

is

all

Membership of the

with

district is involuntary,

property held by landowners having

MID water rights

MID does not have any agreements, written or oral, with members

on

0f the

district. (Id).

MID delivers irrigation water t0 members having water rights appurtenant to their property.
(Id).

MID builds, repairs,

and maintains canals, ditches, and structures

landowners having water rights appurtenant t0 their property. (Id).
maintains canals, ditches, and water appurtenances that are under

MID has n0
district

to deliver water t0

MID regularly repairs

its

and

operation and control.

(1d,).

duty t0 build, maintain, 0r repair the private canals, ditches, 0r structures owned by

members.

(Id.).

MID does not distribute water onto members’
district are responsible for diverting

—

3

(1d,).

Instead,

members 0f the

water from a ﬁxed point of diversion, a headgate, from which

point the distribution of water across property

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

property.

becomes

the responsibility of the

member.

(Id).

A

headgate

is

a gate or valve at a point of diversion that can be opened or closed to regulate the

ﬂow

0f water entering a member’s property. (Id).

Members
is

tasked by

receive water from

MID by requesting delivery of water with a ditch rider, Who

MID with distributing water.

determines Whether there
the requesting

is

(R. p. 97). After a request is

sufﬁcient water available t0 grant permission t0 open the headgate at

member’s property.

(Id).

per the ditch rider’s instruction, and the
property t0 irrigate crops. (Id). The

Once

permitted, the

member may open the headgate

member may divert water from the

member landowner

is

(1d,).

The

ditch rider

member’s property.

is

t0

grow a

crop, if water

is

a speciﬁc

amount 0f water

available. (Id.).

MID water right appurtenant.

and MID.

member desires to halt delivery 0f

tasked with monitoring the amount of water diverted onto a

are authorized to divert, onto acres with a

landowner from

canal onto their

(Id. ).

MID does not allocate
members

as

tasked With ordering the delivery 0f

water from the ditch rider and notifying the ditch rider When the
water.

made, a ditch rider then

MID

is

(1d,).

t0 each acre 0r

member.

MID water right appurtenant,

MID water can only be delivered onto

The amount of irrigation water

(Id). Rather,

sufﬁcient water

acres that have a

available to each

member

not determined by any agreements, written 0r oral, between the

member

(Id.).

MID removes noxious weeds Within its
canals, ditches,

and appurtenances which

provides this service
ability Within

easements and right-of—ways along irrigation

MID owns, operates and controls.

When necessary and economically

time constraints and resources available.
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feasible,

(Id.).

(R. p. 108).

and does so

to the best

MID only
of its

B. Victor Bliss’s Historv With
Plaintiff Victor Bliss is a resident

MID Prior t0 June, 2016

of Minidoka County

who owns

approximately 75.87

acres 0f land Within the district. (R. p. 69, 23:8-20). Plaintiff s 75.87 acres has

appurtenant. (R. p. 97).

irrigation

water into his property.

allow Plaintiff to divert

(Id.).

MID moved a canal that ran along Plaintiff s property. MID deposited dirt that

In 1998,

was

MID has provided at least one headgate to

MID water rights

necessarily excavated from the canal onto the canal bank.

deposited along

its

The canal has a high bank, with

sides. (Id.).

Since the early 2000’s, Plaintiff has leased out the property to Alan and Debra
for $90,000 per year, as well as

the

dirt

Woodlands entered

80 beet shares for $8,000 per year. (R.

into a ﬁve-year written lease

p. 69). In

Woodland

2013, Plaintiff and

agreement for the same terms, With the lease

terminating at the end 0f 2018. (R. p. 69-85).

As the property owner,

MID ditch rider.
water by

was

MID,

Plaintiffhas historically requested delivery of water by contacting a

(R. pp. 76-77, 89:25-91 :4; R. p. 97). Plaintiff has never

but has on some occasions had delivery temporarily delayed until sufﬁcient water

available for Plaintiff” s diversion. (R. p. 97-98). Plaintiff has never

divert

been denied delivery of

more than the amount of water required t0

denied delivery, Plaintiff has

made

irrigate the

t0

75 .87 acres. (Id). Despite never being

multiple reports, written and oral, t0

not receiving as

much water as he would like to have delivered to the

the Woodlands.

(Id.).

Neither Alan nor Debra

been given approval

MID complaining about

75.87 acres 0f land leased by

Woodland have ever reported to MID

that they

have

received less water than the amount entitled upon request, nor have the Woodlands complained
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0f,

0r ﬁled a tort claim alleging, crop

MID.

damage

resulting

from a lack 0f delivery 0f irrigation water by

(Id.).

Plaintiff voluntarily installed a ﬁlter screen at the headgate that is

the 75.87 acres

which

creates a restriction that

encumbers his

used t0 divert water onto

ability to deliver

water onto his

property. (1d,).

C. June 30, 2016 Event and Criminal Charges

Sometime before June

29, 2016, without the ditch rider’s knowledge,

shutting a regulating check structure located in the ditch

downstream from the headgate used

divert water onto Plaintiff s 75.87 acres. (Id). This resulted in

at Plaintiff” s

0f MID

someone began

more water being

t0

available to divert

headgate but cut off 0r reduced the amount of water available t0 downsteam members

Who were

trying t0 irrigate at the

same

time. (Id).

placed a chain and lock on the check structure so that
the lock. (R. pp. 77-78, 97:6-98:1

1;

it

As

a result of these problems,

MID

could not be adjusted Without unlocking

R. p. 98).

On June 29, 20 1 6, Plaintiff met with Frank Hunt, then a member of the Minidoka Irrigation
District

Board of Directors, regarding some concerns he had about the amount of water he was

receiving. (R. pp. 77-78, 98: 12-99: 1 8; R. p.

in his irrigation

that pipe

1

13). Speciﬁcally, Plaintiffwas

system was not receiving enough water. (R.

p. 113). Plaintiff

movers had informed him that there was not enough water

would have

t0

be turned

in the ditch.” (Id.).

off.

—

6

informed Mr. Hunt

in his ditch,

Mr. Hunt then told Plaintiff “it sound[ed]

Mr. Hunt did not make any recommendation
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concerned that a pump

like

and that the pump

he needed more water

t0 Plaintiff t0

remove

the lock,

chain, or

wheel from the check

structure,

and he did not make an agreement with

Plaintiff to

provide him more water. (Id).

On June 30,
structure

2016,

MID discovered that the lock,

had been cut and removed.

(R. p. 99). After learning

Mr. Hunt believed Plaintiff t0 have been the
lock, to

which Plaintiff responded

my attorney.” (R. p.

chain,

“I don’t

culprit.

and Wheel used

from MID

t0 adjust the

that the lock

check

had been

cut,

Mr. Hunt asked Plaintiff why he had cut the

know anything about a lock and I have already talked to

113).

That same day, Vance Johnson, assistant watermaster for MID, spoke With three other
farmers in the

district,

Luke McCall, and Ryan and Randy Knopp.

(R. p. 120).

Luke McCall and

Ryan Knopp informed Mr. Johnson that they had witnessed Plaintiff and his wife
and chain off the check

structure. (Id.).

began

at

t0 yell

and swear

Mr. Johnson eventually managed to

cut the padlock

call Plaintiff,

Who

Mr. Johnson. (Id). Plaintiff told Mr. Johnson that he had he had cut the

lock and chain and lowered the headgate himself. (Id).

Mr. Johnson’s conversation With Plaintiff was overheard by other MID employees, namely

Ruth Bailes and Dan Davidson.

removed

(R. pp. 99, 108).

When Mr.

Johnson asked Plaintiff if he had

the lock, chain, and wheel used t0 adjust the check structure,

Davidson heard Plaintiff say some variation of “Hell yeah I took

it,

Ms. Bailes and Mr.

and you’re not getting

it

back.”

(R. pp. 99, 108).

MID

contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff” s and reported Plaintiff” s activity. Deputy

Ron Stumph responded to MID’S
Bailes,

complaints, and took Witness statements from Mr. Johnson, Ms.

Mr. Davidson, and Mr. Hunt. (R. pp. 99-102, 108-1
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1 1,

113-1 16, 120-124). Charges were

ﬁled by the Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney against
ultimately dismissed after the Plaintiff reimbursed

of a lock, chain, and check structure Wheel. (R.

MID

Plaintiff.

These charges were

$75.00 0n November

7,

2016

for the cost

p. 99).

D. Notice 0f Tort Claim

On March

6,

2017, Plaintiff’ s attorney delivered a

letter t0

MID,

indicating that

damage

made by MID employees

to his reputation

to the

and character due

Minidoka County

t0 alleged

Sheriff’ s ofﬁce. (Id.).

defamatory statements

The

letter

alleged

$54,430.16 in damages for criminal defense and damage t0 reputation and character.
Plaintiff incurred costs associated with defending his criminal suit,

employee holds him

in

was a

The notice claimed

notice of tort claim pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act. (R. pp. 99-106).

Plaintiff experienced

it

(Id.).

and he believes a

MID

lower esteem. (R. pp. 82-83, 135: 1-13924). Plaintiff has testiﬁed that he

is

not aware 0f having lost any business as a result 0f MID’s alleged actions. (R. p. 83, 141 28-15).

On April

17, 2017, Plaintiff

ﬁled his Complaint in the instant action. However, Plaintiff’s

Complaint did not include the same defamation claim as his March
Instead, Plaintiff s

2017 notice of tort claim.

Complaint included claims for breach of contract, breach 0f ﬁduciary duty,

trespass, declaratory relief,

distress.

6,

wrongful prosecution, and intentional inﬂiction of extreme emotional

MID has not received any other notice of tort claim from Plaintiff describing any 0f the

claims stated in Plaintiff‘s Complaint. (R. p. 99).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Under a de novo review,
“this Court's standard
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is

the

same

as the standard

used by the

trial

court in ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.” Purdy

v.

Farmers Ins. C0. ofldaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 P.3d

184, 186 (2003). Disputed facts in the matter

and “summary judgment

is

moving party

show

that there is

no genuine issue

entitled to a judgment as a matter

is

in favor

of the non-moving party,

appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 0n ﬁle,

together with the afﬁdavits, if any,
that the

must be construed

any material

as to

0f law.” Estate ofBecker

v.

fact

and

Callahan,

140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004).

The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory
material fact exists to withstand

P.3d 695, 697 (2007).

“A mere

summary judgment. Finholt v.

scintilla

of evidence or only

assertions that an issue of

Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155

slight

doubt as to the facts

is

not

sufﬁcient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes 0f summary judgment.” Van

PortneufMed.

Ctr.,

147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).

anchored in something more than speculation and a mere
create a genuine issue. Nelson

T0 be considered on
authorities supporting the

initial

v.

Steer,

appeal, the appellant

0f evidence

brief. I.A.R. 35.

reviewed.” Krempasky

v.
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below but raised

Nez Perce

not enough t0

on appeal.” Myers

v.

A reviewing court looks t0 the
Workmen ’s Auto.
cited

lacking, not just if both are lacking.” Bolognese

(1996)). “[I]ssues not raised

is

required to identify legal issues and provide

“A party waives an issue

866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) (quoting State

—

is

arguments in the opening

Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004).
is

A plaintiff’s case must be

118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990).

brief on appeal for the issues presented

authority 0r argument

scintilla

v.

Cly.

v.

0n appeal
v.

Ins. C0.,

140

if either

Forte, 153 Idaho 857,

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970

for the ﬁrst time

Planning

& Zoning,

0n appeal will not be considered 0r
150 Idaho 23 1, 236, 245 P.3d 983,

988 (2010) (quoting Whitted v. Canyon

Cly. Bd.

ofComm’rs, 137 Idaho 118, 122, 44 P.3d 1173,

1177 (2002)).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT CLAIMS II, III, AND V OF
BLISS’S COMPLAINT WERE TORT CLAIMS SUBJECT TO NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER IDAHO CODE § 6-901 ETSEQ.
The

Counts

district court

II, III,

and

properly applied the notice requirements 0f the Idaho Tort Claims Act to

V of Bliss’s Complaint because there is simply no authority, whether based in

statute or case law, t0 suggest that claims for

breach of ﬁduciary duty, trespass, wrongful

prosecution, and intentional inﬂiction 0f emotional distress as against

tort claims. First,

MID fall outside the arena 0f

with regard to ﬁduciary duty, Bliss’s position on MID’s duties

owed under the

Idaho constitution and created under statute and Whether such duties are subj ect t0

tort 0r contract

claims misses the mark. Bliss dedicates several pages in his briefto explaining that contract claims
are not subj ect to the notice requirements 0f the

MID’s ﬁduciary duties and

its

ITCA, but

fails t0

make any demonstration

general duty t0 operate, maintain, and repair canal systems are

contractual duties. Bliss has identiﬁed cases that state contract claims are not subj ect to the

(see, e.g.

County ofKootenai

(1988); Wickstrom

that trusts create

v.

v.

Western Casualty

& Surely C0.,

’n v.

ITCA

113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 87

N0. Idaho COIL, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986)), cases that establish

ﬁduciary duties

(see, e.g. Dbsi/Trz'

VP ’ship v. P ’hsip v Bender,

948 P.2d 151 (1997), and cases describing contracts implied in
Contrs. Ass

that

City ofHayden, 164 Idaho 530

—

10

Idaho Bldg.

432 P.3d 976 (2018). However, there

fundamental disconnect in Bliss’s argument in that he

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

fact (see, e.g. N.

130 Idaho 796,

fails t0

is

a

provide any authority demonstrating

(1) that

MID’S

general duty t0 operate, maintain, and repair

its

ditches and canal system

ﬁduciary duty, and (2) that any 0f the general or ﬁduciary duties

is

a

MID owed to him created a

contract, express or implied.

The
its

district court

properly held that

MID has a general duty to operate, maintain, and repair

canal system, and the failure to do so With resulting damages

footnote

1,

citing

Pioneer Irr. Dist.

(2012); Stephenson

v.

City ofCaldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 599, 288 P.3d 810, 816

ﬁduciary duties or sound in contract law.

identiﬁed, Bliss’s breach 0f ﬁduciary duty claim

weeds within the

operates and maintains

its

canals, laterals,

contract.

T0

its

MID’s

is

its

based on the allegation that MID’s failure to

and

its

right-of—way, as well as the

he

is

it

if

MID were to owe

ITCA t0

11

As

is

no authority

that

such, the district court

Bliss’s claim of breach of ﬁduciary duty

any ﬁduciary duties

t0 Bliss, there is

no authority

tort subject t0 the

clearly establishes that ﬁduciary duties

—

weeds or

owed by MID.

ﬁduciary duties would sound in contract law rather than

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

it

may be true that MID may

however there

the equivalent of a ﬁduciary duty.” (R. p. 426).

relates t0 general duties

shown that case law

manner

entitled to. (R. pp. 419). Bliss

alleged failure t0 control noxious

canals and laterals

correctly applied the notice requirements 0f the

Even

As the district court correctly

the contrary, as the district court correctly points out, “[i]t

every statutory duty

n0 authority

is

canals constitutes a breach of a ﬁduciary duty, let alone a breach of

have certain statutory duties t0 maintain

to the extent

is

canals, has deprived Bliss of water

has cited no authority to demonstrate that
maintain and operate

negligence. (R. pp. 419,

Pioneer Irr. Dist, 49 Idaho 189, 288 P. 421 (1930)). There

v.

that these general duties are

control noxious

is

sound under

ITCA.
tort

that such

Bliss himself has

law through

his

reliance

on the recent decision from Skinner

decision in Jones

v.

Runft, Leroy,

(1994), this Court has

w
Idaho

in

at

made

which the duty to

it

Bank Mort, 159 Idaho 642

& Mathews,

act is created

by the

its

a breach ofﬁduciarv duty

relationship

between the

is

a negligence

parties.” Skinner, 159

t0 suggest that the duties

are anything but duties subj ect to actions in tort.

verbal, or implied contract

MID has

district t0

(2016). Citing

Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868

clear that “a claim for

Bliss has not identiﬁed

Valley

U.S.

647 (emphasis added). Bliss has not identiﬁed any authority

owed by MID

Which

Coﬂin

v.

any contract between

between

are enunciated in

MID and Bliss.

MID and Bliss. As explained in later sections, the only duties

LC.

§

42-1201

et seq.

The

one of its members or landowners does not give

Irr. Dist. v.

There has been no written,

statutory relationship of an irrigation

rise to

an implied contract. Snake River

Stevens, 18 Idaho 541, 110 P. 1033 (1910). Because n0 contract exists that

incorporates the language 0f LC. § 42-1201 et seq., Bliss’s claim for breach 0f ﬁduciary duty
necessarily one in

and the

tort,

district court

subj ect t0 the requirements of the

was proper

in

its

determination that his claim

is

is

ITCA.

Bliss presents another argument in his brief t0 cobble the appearance 0f an existing

contract, stating that

“MID

obtains their [sic] authority to be present

thereof, pursuant t0 their [sic] contracts entered into With the

that Bliss is therefore a protected third-party

25).

MID has

0n

Bliss’s property, or lack

Bureau 0f Reclamation”, asserting

beneﬁciary under said contract. (Appellant’s Brief,

p.

a contract with the Bureau 0f Reclamation that grants authority to deliver water to

users. (R. pp. 201-34). This contract does not create

Bliss fail to demonstrate

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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any third-party rights for Bliss. Not only does

how the alleged acts or omissions ofMID breach this alleged contract, but

12

Bliss brings this

argument for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, having never made mention 0f this position

t0 the district court below. “[I]ssues not raised

below but raised

be considered 0r reviewed.” Krempasky, 150 Idaho
Bliss’s

it

new argument must not be

relates t0 the

ITCA’S

at

for the ﬁrst time

0n appeal Will not

236, 245 P.3d at 988 (2010).

As

such,

considered, and the district court’s decision should be upheld as

applicability to Bliss’s claim for breach of ﬁduciary duty.

Second, Bliss has not provided any authority to support his position that a claim for
trespass

somehow stems from

and arguments concerning contracts implied
of trespass as a contractual duty. As the
a tort against possession

deﬁning ﬁduciary duties

in fact, but gives absolutely

n0 authority on the basis

district court

properly identiﬁes, “[t]he claim of trespass

when one, without permission,

possession 0f the property.” (R. p. 420, citing Jaquith

808 (1957)). As such, the

district court’s

subj ect t0 the notice requirements 0f the

ﬁve pages

t0

contract law. Bliss dedicates

interferes with another’s exclusive right t0

v.

Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 54, 3 10 P.2d 805,

decision that Bliss’s claim for trespass

ITCA

Lastly, Bliss has provided absolutely

Bliss failed t0 provide

is

a tort and

is

should be upheld.

n0 authority

to support his position that claims for

wrongful prosecution and intentional inﬂiction 0f emotional distress

Not only has

is

fall

under a theory 0f contract.

any authority to support his position, case law overwhelmingly

supports the district court’s determination that claims for wrongful prosecution and intentional
inﬂiction of emotional distress are tort claims. See, e.g.

414 (1963) (holding

Howard v.

Felton, 85 Idaho 286, 379 P.2d

that a claim for malicious prosecution is a tort claim);

Gibson

v.

Ada

County,

142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2005) (holding that a claim for intentional 0r negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress

is

a tort claim). Bliss has failed t0 provide any support for his position; therefore,
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the district court’s determination that the claims under

notice requirements under the

II.

ITCA

Count V of Bliss’s Complaint

are subject to

should be upheld.

THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BLISS’S CLAIMS OF
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, TRESPASS, AND INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR FAILURE TO FILE
REQUISITE NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM UNDER THE IDAHO TORT CLAIMS
ACT.
The

district court’s dismissal

of Bliss’s claims of breach of ﬁduciary duty, trespass, and

intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress should be upheld because Bliss failed t0 ﬁle an adequate

Notice 0f Tort Claim under the ITCA. Idaho Code § 6-906 requires that

under the provisions 0f this act and

political subdivision arising

all

“[a]11

claims against a

claims against an employee 0f

a political subdivision for any act 0r omission 0f the employee Within the course 0r scope 0f his

employment

shall

be presented to and ﬁled with the clerk or secretary of the

Within one hundred eighty
discovered, Whichever

(ITCA)

is t0

(1

v.

80) days from the date the claim arose 0r reasonably should have been

is later.”

The primary function of notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act

put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against

notice serving that ﬁmction

political subdivision

is

sufﬁcient unless the governmental entity

PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 982, footnote

The purpose of the notice requirement

is t0

it is

is

being prosecuted, and

misled t0

its

injury.

3 (2009).

“(1) save needless expense

and

litigation

by

providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow
authorities t0 conduct a full investigation into the cause 0f the injury in order t0 determine the

extent 0f the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.” Mitchell

v.

Bingham Memorial Hosp, 130 Idaho 420, 424, 942 P.2d 544, 548 (1997) (quoting Pounds
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Van

v.

Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991)).

A plaintiff is not exempt from

notice of claim requirement because of substantial actual notice having been given; thus,

compliance With notice requirements 0f the
failure

of which

is fatal

to a claim,

ITCA

n0 matter how

is

a mandatory condition t0 bringing

legitimate.

McQuillen

v.

City

suit,

the

ofAmmon, 113

Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 745 (1987); LC. § 6-908.
In this case, Bliss’s claims for breach of ﬁduciary duty and trespass were properly

dismissed because he did not ﬁle a Notice 0f Tort Claim to adequately put
those claims

damages

would be brought.

arising out

to reputation

Bliss’s February 28,

2017

letter t0

MID

on notice

that

MID only described injury and

of alleged defamatory statements, With alleged damages in the form of injury

and character. The only claim Bliss put

MID

defamation. Bliss did not provide any additional notice t0

on notice of through the

MID.

letter

(R. pp. 80-8 1). Bliss’s

was

for

Complaint

ultimately did not even include a claim for defamation, and instead included three claims for

damages

for negligent and/or wrongful conduct

— breach of ﬁduciary duty,

prosecution/intentional inﬂiction of extreme emotional distress.

determined that such notice was

at least sufﬁcient to

put

MID

While the

trespass,

district court

on notice of Bliss’s claim

wrongful prosecution, there was nothing within his Notice of Tort Claim to inform
intent to bring claims for breach

emotional distress.

and wrongful

MID

for

of his

of ﬁduciary duty, trespass, and intentional inﬂiction 0f extreme

MID was not adequately put 0n notice 0f potential claims

for breach

of

ﬁduciary duty, trespass, and intentional inﬂiction of extreme emotional distress through Bliss’s
letter that

only alleged defamation.

As

such,

MID could not have conducted 0r have reason to

conduct any meaningful investigation into the cause 0f such claims, nor put together any defenses
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MID would not have had any reason to

for those claims, because

anticipate those claims being

brought.

Bliss argues that the notice requirements 0f the

MID’s

secretary

was allegedly “acutely aware” 0f Bliss’s

However, Bliss has not provided any evidence
that

it

was

his claims.

the February 28,

To

ITCA were

2017

letter t0

the extent Bliss argues

substantially

claims. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 28).

that this is true, nor has

MID’S

attorney,

met because

Kent

he provided any evidence

Fletcher, that

made MID aware 0f

MID had actual 0r constructive notice, Bliss is not exempt

from notice of claim requirement because of substantial actual notice having been given.
McQuillen, 113 Idaho
Bliss’s February 28,

at

722, 747 P.2d at 745.

2017

letter

misled

Even

if

MID had actual notice

0f potential claims,

MID as t0 what claims were being pursued and as to Bliss’s

alleged damages.

Further, the

documents Bliss identiﬁes as alleged additional LC.

§

6-906 notices (R. pp.

304-3 16) (hereafter the “Attorney Letters”) do not constitute sufﬁcient Notices of Tort Claim for

two reasons.

MID,

as

is

First, Bliss

did not ﬁle the aforementioned documents With the clerk or secretary of

required under LC. § 6-906. Second, the informal communications between Plaintiff s

attorney and

MID’S

attorney are invalid, insufﬁcient notices because they misled

0f action and injury claimed. While there

is

n0 express format

for a claim

MID t0 the cause

under the ITCA,

6-907 speciﬁes that a claim must include:
A11 claims presented to and ﬁled with a governmental entity shall accurately
describe the conduct and circumstances Which brought about the injury or

damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury 0r
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and
shall contain the amount 0f damages claimed, together With a statement 0f
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I.C. §

the actual residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and ﬁling the

claim and for a period 0f six (6) months immediately prior t0 the time the
claim arose. If the claimant is incapacitated from presenting and ﬁling his
claim within the time prescribed or if the claimant
claimant

is

a nonresident of the state and

is

a minor or if the

is

absent during the time within

Which his claim is required t0 be ﬁled, the claim may be presented and ﬁled
0n behalf of the claimant by any relative, attorney or agent representing the
claimant.

A claim ﬁled under the provisions of this section shall not be held

invalid or insufﬁcient

by reason 0f an inaccuracy

in stating the time, place,

nature 0r cause 0f the claim, or otherwise, unless

governmental entity was in fact misled to

LC.

§

its

it

is

shown

that the

injury thereby.

6-907 (West through 2018). Plaintiffrelies 0n the decision in Cox

v.

City ofSandpoint, 140

Idaho 127, 90 P.3d 352 (2003) t0 support his position that communications t0 a municipal entity’s
attorney satisﬁes the notice requirements under the

ITCA. However,

the facts and decision in

Sandpoint instead refute Plaintiff s position, and demonstrate that his attorney’s communications
With MID’s attorney were insufﬁcient notice.
In Sandpoint, the plaintiff s attorney sent a letter t0 the city’s attorney that described the

following information: (1) the conduct and circumstances which brought about a claimed injury to

Cox;

(2) the injury in

monetary terms, and includes dates relevant

demanded payment 0f a speciﬁc amount With

t0 the alleged injury; (3)

interest due; (4) the annual billing statements

addressed to the City identifying the lease by number and the parties to the lease; and (5) a tracking

by date of the imposition of rent,

the accrual of interest, the

therefore, the city's failure t0 pay,

358.

The court

in

Which was the alleged cause 0f the

Id.
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city,

injury. Id. at 133,

Sandpoint decided that the information included within the

as t0 not mislead the city t0 the plaintiff’ s injury,

under the ITCA.

payments made by the

letter

and,

9O P.3d

at

was sufﬁcient

and therefore satisﬁed the notice requirements

Here, Bliss’s documents to

MID’s

attorney

fail to

meet the notice requirements under the

ITCA because

they did not describe the actual conduct, persons, injury, and damages involved in

Bliss’s claims,

and thereby misled

MID as t0 Bliss’s

Unlike the attorney’s

injuries.

letter in

Sandpoint, here the Attorney Letters do not provide a description 0f the conduct and circumstances
bringing alleged injury, the injury in monetary terms, any relevant dates, or persons involved. For

example, the invoice for the removal 0f noxious weeds does not describe Where such removal took
place. (R. p. 304). Bliss’s invoice, prepared

by himself, contains

claims t0 have performed, but does not indicate where such

arbitrary

work was done.

misled as t0 the injury claimed Where Bliss could be attempting to
Bliss’s

own property and not within any duty owed by MID.

notice under the

amounts

bill

MID

(Id.).

for

for

As

work he

such,

MID is

work done on

Therefore, the invoice

is

insufﬁcient

ITCA.

Additionally, in the letter dated September 9, 2015 (R. pp. 307-9), Bliss’s attorney alleges
injury as a result of MID’s alleged failure to fulﬁll

42- 1203. Speciﬁcally, the

letter states that

its

duties prescribed under

“[MID] was notiﬁed 0n multiple occasions by Mr.

about the problems and the work that needed t0 be done.” (R.
description as to

Who was
2015

When

Bliss allegedly notiﬁed

letter further alleges that

p. 308).

p. 307).

However, there

is

Bliss

n0

what these “problems and work that needed t0 be done” were, when they occurred,

involved, and

overﬂowed onto

LC. §§ 42-1202 and

“due t0 poor maintenance, just recently MID’S

[Bliss’s] crop,”

However, Without

MID about these issues.

and indicated

stating

any

dates,

that

it is

The September
lateral ditch

damages would be calculated

impossible for

MID

9,

in the future. (R.

or even this Court t0

determine Whether the aforementioned ﬂooding occurred Within the allowed 180-day notiﬁcation
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period under the ITCA.

As

such, the September 9,

2015

letter is also

insufﬁcient notice under the

ITCA.
Bliss’s letter dated

requirements under the
as t0 allow

November 23, 2015

(R. pp. 3 12-14) similarly fails to satisfy the notice

ITCA because it, too, fails to provide relevant dates, conduct, and identities

MID t0 reasonably prepare defenses

November 23, 2015

letter still

and understand the claims being brought. The

does not indicate Where supposed removal 0f noxious weeds took

place.

The Attorney

by

failing to put

Letters misled

MID

MID

as t0 the causes 0f action intended

on notice 0f any of the actual claims Bliss intended

Bliss discusses the removal 0f noxious weeds, he did not bring

and

injuries

t0 bring in tort.

any claims

claimed

While

in tort concerning

noxious weeds. Instead, Bliss pled the alleged duty to remove noxious weeds as part of his claim
for declaratory relief. (R. pp. 13-14).

The

disparate nature of the Attorney Letters

against the ultimate Complaint ﬁled misled

MID

as t0 the injury Bliss

compared

was claiming.

MID was

misled as t0 the injury claimed by Bliss in the Attorney Letters, and therefore was not 0n adequate
notice as to fully investigate and prepare a defense.

Further, Bliss’s treatment of his claims that

MID’s

actions allegedly resulted in

ﬂooding

is

so dissimilar between the Attorney Letters and Bliss’s handling of this matter through brieﬁng as

t0 render notice as t0 Plaintiff s intent t0 bring

a

moment the

fact that Bliss

attorney’s letters t0

MID’s
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in tort impossible. Disregarding for

never included a date for the alleged conduct leading to ﬂooding in his

attorney, the

be pursuing the ﬂooding matter as a
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ﬂooding claims

November 23, 2015

tort claim”. (R. p. 3 12).

letter clearly indicates that Bliss “will

However,

as Bliss sits

now, he

is

arguing that the ﬂooding matter, which he alleged as part ofhis breach 0f ﬁduciary duty claim,
matter under contract law, and not a

arguing that his injury

falls

tort.

Bliss has unquestionably misled

was seeking

as t0 his injury

a

by

under a different legal category than that originally indicated in the

Attorney Letters. Based 0n the November 23, 2015
believe Bliss

MID

is

redress for alleged

letter

damages

and the Complaint,

in tort,

MID was

and thus prepared

its

lead to

defenses

accordingly. However, Plaintiff now argues that the ﬂooding matter falls under contract law,

which provides

different

damages and

avails

MID to different defenses than those prepared for. As

such, the Attorney Letters did not constitute sufﬁcient notice under the

Lastly, Bliss’s

ITCA.

argument that the Attorney Letters satisﬁed the notice requirement under

ITCA because “[ﬂormer Chairman

of the Board Frank Hunt

.

.

.

acknowledges

that Bliss has

legitimate complaints” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 3 1) does not comport with the appropriate legal

standard.

As

government
need

Bliss himself has cited, “[t]he primary function 0f notice under the

entity

on notice

t0 preserve evidence

that a claim against

it is

ITCA is t0 put the

being prosecuted and thus apprise

and perhaps prepare a defense.” Blass

v.

it

0f the

County ofTwin Falls, 132

Idaho 451, 452-53, 974 P.2d 503, 504-05 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). However, in actions
against governmental entities, plaintiffs are not

exempt from the notice 0f claim requirements

because of substantial actual notice having been given. McQuillen, 113 Idaho
744; Independent School Dist. ofBoise City

disapproved 0n other grounds; Larson

P.2d 1168 (1978); Cazkms
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v.

v.

v.

Callister,

at

722, 747 P.2d at

97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975),

Emmett Joint School Dist. N0. 221, 99 Idaho

Fruitland, 97 Idaho 263, 543 P.2d 166 (1975).

120, 577

Bliss relies

on actual notice

t0 establish notice in three

ways.

First,

he contends that

MID

had actual notice through communications with MID’s attorney. However, as demonstrated above,
the Attorney Letters do not constitute sufﬁcient notice under the

ITCA. Additionally, regardless 0f

whether MID’s attorney had actual notice 0f a potential claim and

injury, as

actual notice does not relieve the requirement t0 ﬁle a formal Notice of Tort

Second, Bliss contends that

were discussed

at

MID had actual notice 0f Bliss’s

board meetings. However,

ITCA. The Attorney

this fails to

shown

in

McQuillen,

Claim under the ITCA.

claims because the Attorney Letters

meet the notice requirements under the

Letters did not constitute sufﬁcient formal notice,

and actual notice does not

relieve the requirement 0f formal notice.

Third, Bliss points t0 the deposition testimony of Frank Hunt, former chairman of the

Board of Directors,

t0 argue that

MID

he had actual notice. Despite the fact that Mr. Hunt’s testimony is

taken entirely out 0f context, Mr. Hunt’s opinions and actual notice concerning the legitimacy 0f
Bliss’s claims does not impart formal notice t0

In

all

of the above instances, Bliss has relied on alleged actual notice to support his contention that

notice

As

MID as to satisfy the requirements under the ITCA.

had been given under the ITCA,

such, there

is

in clear contradiction t0 the legal standard

n0 genuine issue 0f material

notice requirements under the

ITCA. The

fact that the

district court

under McQuillen.

Attorney Letters did not satisfy the

properly dismissed Bliss’s claims for

breach 0f ﬁduciary duty, trespass, and intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, and
should be upheld.
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its

decision

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BLISS HAD
FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MID HAD BREACHED ANY ALLEGED
FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED TO BLISS.
1.

MID’s Duties are Prescribed bv

Statute,

Not Through the Existence 0f a

Fiduciarv Relationship.

The

district court correctly

irrigation district, a creation

of state government, and

its

duties

MID is an

and obligations are controlled by

See generally, Idaho Code, Title 43. The applicable duties governing the irrigation

state statute.

district are set forth

summarized

dismissed Bliss’s claim for breach of ﬁduciary duty.

by Idaho Code,

The applicable

Title 42.

duties of an irrigation district can

as follows:

Duties Imposed on Irrigation District

Statute

§42-1201

Keep canals full 0f water during
l-November 1).

o

Maintain the

ﬂow

irrigation season (April

as full as possible t0 ensure water users receive

water entitlement.
§

42-1202

Maintain the banks of canals in good order and repair so they are
ready t0 receive water by the ﬁrst of April.

o

Construct canals as necessary to properly deliver water t0 persons
having rights t0 use the water.
§

42-1203

Keep and maintain

o

the

embankments thereof in good

repair, in

order t0 prevent waste 0f water during the irrigation season.

Not permit a

greater quantity 0f water to be turned into the canal

than can be easily contained.

Note: The purpose of this section
discharge and running
§

42-1204

T0

o

is

t0 prevent

wasting and useless

away of water.
embankments
not damage or in any way

carefully keep and maintain the canals and

good

repair and condition so as to

in

injure

the property or premises of others.

T0 clean, maintain and repair canals with equipment
commonly used 0r reasonably adapted for the work.

that is

Deposit debris and other matter taken from the canals onto the
banks.
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be

§

42-1205

o

Construct bridges over canals that satisfy required speciﬁcations.

§

42-1206

o

To

MID does not have
maintain

its

repair ditches located

a duty to individual landowners within the district to repair and

canals relative t0 ﬂooding.

handle ﬂoodwaters. In

common property.

0n

fact,

MID has n0

obligation t0 manage, prevent, or otherwise

Idaho Code § 42-1203 and § 42-1204 speciﬁcally articulate that an

irrigation district is only responsible for

its

water:

The owners or constructors of such
aqueducts, while responsible for their
liable for

damage 0r

ditches,

own

injury caused by: (1)

acts

works 0r other
or omissions, shall not be
canals,

The diversion 0r discharge 0f

water into a ditch, canal, works or other aqueduct by a third party Without
the permission of the owner or owners of the ditch, canal, works or other
aqueduct; (2) Any other act 0r omission of a third party, other than an
employee 0r agent ofthe owner or owners of the ditch, canal, works 0r other
aqueduct; or (3)
natural

An act 0f God,

including ﬁre, earthquake, storm or similar

phenomenon.

LC. §§ 42-1203 and 42-1204.
Irrigation districts

owe no duty t0 prevent

seasonal ﬂoods. Idaho

Code

§

42-1204

speciﬁcally recognizes that “owners or constructors of such ditches, canals, works 0r other

aqueducts, while responsible for their

injury caused by:

.

.

.

(3)

An act 0f God,

phenomenon.” Idaho Code
Harper

v.

District,

own

§

acts 0r omissions, shall

not be liable for damage 0r

including ﬁre, earthquake, storm 0r similar natural

42-1204. Idaho law also clearly recognizes the Act of God defense.

Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278, 286, 371 P.2d 842 (1962); Johnson

v.

Burley Irrigation

78 Idaho 392, 398, 304 P.2d 912 (1956). Although a precise deﬁnition has not been

clearly established under Idaho law, Idaho
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Code

§

42-1204 suggests

that

an Act of God are storms

or similar natural phenomenon.

“act of God” as one that

The Johnson court characterized an

“proceeds from the force of nature alone, t0 the entire exclusion 0f human agency.” 78 Idaho

at

398-99, 304 P.2d at 916. The Harper court deﬁned an “act 0f God” as “those events and accidents

which proceed from natural causes and cannot be anticipated or guarded against or resisted.” 84
Idaho

at

286, 371 P.2d at 846.

Idaho Code

§

42-1204 was amended in 2012 and the

legislative desire to shield

third parties.

an irrigation

district

As conﬁrmed by the March

amendment was proposed to codify
to others that is

19,

from

existing law that the

Where the damage

is

owner 0f a canal

the strong

p. 93). In that

is

notes, the

not liable for

damage

amendment was intended t0

and those on the bench,

caused by an Act 0f God. (R.

Committee

State Affairs

p. 92). Further, that the

clarify for the water delivery entities, attorneys,

conﬁrms

damages caused by acts of God or

liability for

2012 Senate

caused by the acts of God. (R.

legislative history

that liability does not exist

same hearing, Senator Darrington

provided an example of what the legislation was intended t0 clear up:
Senator Darrington said a real-life example was
cloudburst in July

and washed

when the

When there was

canals were running, and the water

into the canals. Before they could cut

it

at the

miles upstream, they had a problem downstream. This

being talked about. Mr. Semanko said

this is correct

is

and

a big

came down

head several

exactly What
it is

is

a serious,

important issue.

(R. p. 94).

natural

When addressing the Act of God,

phenomenon and not man—made

pronouncement of the Idaho Legislature

Act of God. As noted above
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it

was speciﬁed

that

an Act 0f God must be a

or artiﬁcial. (R. p. 93). Ultimately, the clear

is

that liability

does not exist for damages caused by an

in the legislative history, the Legislature

was concerned about

was

clarifying that liability

third party or

The

limited to the irrigation districts

own water and not the water from

an act 0f God.

duties Bliss claims

MID breached are not actual duties

imposed 0n the

Speciﬁcally,

MID does not owe any individual ﬁduciary duties to Bliss,

found in LC.

§

42-1201

et seq. Bliss has not

owing only those

district court

determination that Bliss failed to identify any existing ﬁduciary duty, and
Bliss’s claim for breach

Bliss

2.

is

duties

its

was

correct in

its

decision to dismiss

0f ﬁduciary duty should be upheld.

Has Not Demonstrated

the Existence 0f a Fiduciary Relationship.

ﬁrst step in determining whether or not there has been a breach of ﬁduciary duty

establish the existence of a ﬁduciary relationship.

When one

District.

provided any evidence t0 demonstrate the existence 0f

any duties outside those prescribed by Idaho Code. As such, the

The

a

“A

is t0

ﬁduciary relation exists between two parties

under a duty to act or t0 give advice for the beneﬁt of the other upon a matter within

the scope 0fthe relation.”

Podolan

280, 289 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing

v.

Idaho Legal Aid Services, Ina, 123 Idaho 937, 946, 854 P.2d

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

874 comment a

(1 979)).

“A ﬁduciary relationship
deﬁned
Who,

in law, but

in equity

interest

it

does not depend upon some technical relation created by or

exists in cases

where there has been a special conﬁdence imposed

and good conscience,

is

bound

t0 act in

of one reposing the confidence.” Steams

840-41 (1952) (citing Staab
340, 123 P.2d 686; Dyblie
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v.

v.

v.

good

faith

and With due regard

Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288,

Staab, 160 Kan. 417, 163 P.2d 418; Renegar

Dyblie, 389

III.

v.

in another

t0 the

240 P.2d 833,

Bruning, 190 Okl.

326, 59 N.E.2d 657; and Szekeres

v.

Reed, 96

Cal.App.2d 348, 215 P.2d 522). “The

facts

and circumstances must indicate

that the

one reposing

the trust has foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting arguments

not in his

own behalf,

but in the interests 0f the other party.” Burwell

288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986) (quoted

in

v.

is

acting

South Carolina Nat. Bank,

Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods,

Ina, 121 Idaho 266, 278, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991)).

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals has
will

impose ﬁduciary obligations 0n the

stated,

“[e]xamples of relationships from which the law

parties include

when the parties

are:

members 0f the same

family, partners, attorney and client, executor and beneﬁciary 0f an estate, principal and agent,
insurer and insured, or close friends.” Mitchell

714

(Ct.

v.

Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707,

App. 1991). Idaho appellate courts have also identiﬁed

ﬁduciary relationship as a matter 0f law. See,

e.g.,

relations that

Country Cove Dev.,

Inc.

150 P.3d 288, 296 (2006) (“a debtor-creditor relationship does not give

and Wade Baker

& Sons Farms v.

between

rise to a

May, 143 Idaho 595,

rise t0 a

ﬁduciary duty”);

Corp. ofPresiding Bishop ofChurch ofJesus Christ 0f

Latter—Day Saints, 136 Idaho 922, 928, P.3d 715, 722
ordinarily arises

v.

d0 not give

(Ct.

App. 2002) (“no ﬁduciary duty

parties t0 an arm's length business transaction”).

Here, Bliss dedicates several pages of brieﬁng to deﬁning What a ﬁduciary relationship

and then merely

somehow

all

asserts that not only does

statutory duties

is,

MID have a ﬁduciary relationship With him, but

owed by MID

are

somehow ﬁduciary

duties. Bliss

has not

demonstrated or even alleged facts sufﬁcient to establish the existence 0f a ﬁduciary relationship

between himself and MID necessary for the duties alleged in his Complaint t0 be a ﬁduciary duties.

MID is not an entity owing general responsibilities t0 Plaintiff t0
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act in his best interests or

on

his

behalf.

At

best, as the district court identiﬁed,

members/landowners not

MID may have

a ﬁduciary duty t0

to distribute water held in trust for the

beneﬁt 0f its members to lands
is

no authority

MID

and Bliss do

outside 0f the district Without consent of its members. (R. p. 425). However, there

subscribing any general duties

owed by MID

as ﬁduciary duties

owed

to Bliss.

not share a relationship as any of those listed by the court in Mitchell such as would create a

ﬁduciary duty for

MID to operate, maintain,

and repair

its

ditches and laterals.

As

such, Bliss has

not demonstrated facts to support the existence 0f a ﬁduciary relationship between himself and

MID, and the
IV.

district court

was proper

0f ﬁduciary duty.

in dismissing his claim for breach

CLAIM OF WRONGFUL PROSECUTION WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED BECAUSE BLISS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FA CIE CASE
FOR WRONGFUL PROSECUTION AND DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR MALICE.
BLISS’S

The

district court

properly dismissed Bliss’s claim for wrongful prosecution because he

cannot establish a prima facie case.

As

relied

upon by the

district court

below, a plaintiff must

prove six elements t0 demonstrate a primafacie case for wrongful/malicious prosecution: (1) a
prosecution; (2) that terminated in favor 0f the plaintiff; (3) that the defendant

was

the prosecutor

0r that the defendant instigated the prosecution; (4) malice; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6)

damages. Shannahan

Gigray, 131 Idaho 664, 667, 962 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1998); Harrold

v.

Idaho State Schoolfor the Deafand Blind, 112 Idaho 410, 732 P.2d 379

Summary judgment was
cannot establish

at least
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App. 1987).

properly granted on Bliss’s wrongful prosecution claim because he

two 0f the above elements — termination
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in favor

of Bliss and malice.

Civil

1.

The

Compromise

district court

is

Not a Termination

in

Favor of Bliss.

properly dismissed Bliss’s wrongﬁJI prosecution claim due to a fatal

present in the absence 0f any termination in favor 0f Bliss.

As

ﬂaw

the district court identiﬁed, Bliss

“cannot show that the case was necessarily dismissed in his favor since he did pay restitution to

MID as a result of the prosecution.” (R. pp.
a

sum of $75.00

427-28). The “restitution” the district court refers t0

Bliss paid to the prosecutor’s ofﬁce t0

compromise

his charged offense,

is

Which

Bliss himself attests to in his brieﬁng. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 40).

Bliss appears t0 take

was

umbrage With

the result 0f a “restitution” as

“Compromises of Offenses After

the district court’s determination that the

deﬁned under the law. Idaho Code

Code

§

19-3401, titled

Satisfaction” provides “[w]hen a defendant

a charge 0f misdemeanor, for which the person injured

remedy by a

§

civil action, the offense

by the

is

held to answer on

act constituting the offense has a

may be compromised as provided in

19-3402 then provides that the court and prosecutor

compromise

[I.C. §

19-3402].” Idaho

may stay proceedings upon the

prosecution and dismiss charges against the defendant upon satisfaction for the injury.

The
Bliss

facts,

When Viewed

in a light

most favorable

to Bliss, demonstrate the following: (1)

was charged with a misdemeanor of Wrongful Diversion of Water

(R. pp. 413-14); (2) Bliss

paid $75.00 through the prosecutor’s ofﬁce in relation t0 the damages alleged in his misdemeanor

charge (R. pp. 99; Appellant’s Brief,

p. 40); (3)

following the payment 0f $75.00 through the

prosecutor’s ofﬁce, Bliss’s misdemeanor charge
necessarily a “restitution” as strictly

offense

was dismissed

deﬁned under the law,

(R. p. 414).

the facts

show

While

this is

not

that Bliss’s criminal

was dropped as a result 0f a civil compromise. “Where the termination of a prosecution has
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been brought about by the procurement 0f the defendant, 0r bv a compromise 0r agreement 0f
the parties, an action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained.” Campbell v.

Ca, 30 Idaho

is

therefore not a termination in his favor for the purposes of a

wrongﬁJI prosecution claim. Therefore, the
district court’s

district court

was proper

in dismissing Bliss’s claim,

decision should be upheld.

N0 Evidence

2.

Trust

552, 166 P. 258 (1917) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Bliss’s civil

compromise of his misdemeanor

and the

Bank &

0f Malice.

In addition to lacking a termination in his favor, Bliss failed t0 demonstrate any evidence 0f

malice necessary to support his wrongful prosecution claim. Bliss argues that

MID employees

misrepresented facts in their written statements to law enforcement. (R. pp. 99, 102, 108, 111, 113,
116, 120, 123-24). There

is

n0 evidence

to suggest that the descriptions provided in the written

statements misrepresent whether Bliss had authority to remove the lock and chain at the headgate.
Bliss’s sole

argument for the misrepresentative nature of the written statements

insistence that Frank

Hunt gave him

authority t0

remove

relies

0n

his

the lock and chain, citing Mr. Hunt’s

written statement for support. However, Mr. Hunt’s written statement does not say he authorized
Bliss to d0 anything at

Hunt speciﬁcally says
tell

someone

to take

all, let

that

he “did not and would not

someone

support his position that any

Even

if the written

alone cut and remove the lock and chain. (R. p. 116). Rather, Mr.

else’s water.” (Id).

MID
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The

anyone

t0 cut a lock

facts presented

by

employee made a misrepresentation

nor would [he] ever

Bliss in this case

d0 not

in their written statements.

statements misrepresented the facts, Bliss has provided n0 evidence t0

suggest that such misrepresentation
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was made knowingly or

intentionally, let alone maliciously.

Bliss asserts that the written statements

his conclusion.

were “intentionally

false” Without

any evidence

to support

Without any evidence 0f actual malice, Bliss cannot maintain a claim for wrongful

prosecution.

Bliss argues that

Ruth Bailes demonstrated malice by allegedly “improperly and

unlawfully” copying and distributing materials t0 board

argument

was

is

members

in

November, 2017. This

not only entirely irrelevant and subsequent t0 his June, 2016 criminal prosecution,

it

also not raised before the district court below. Bliss insists that the alleged acts 0f Ms. Bailes

regarding distributing materials t0 board

members were

and outrageous”, but does not even attempt
over a year

earlier. Bliss therefore

has

“outside normal boundaries of decency

t0 tie these alleged acts t0 her written statement

made no

effort to

made

demonstrate that the written statement of

Ms. Bailes was motivated by actual malice.
Similarly, Bliss’s

malice

fails

argument

because there

statement. Bliss

is

Dan Davidson’s subsequent

statements demonstrate

nothing tying the alleged subsequent statements t0 his written

may have been “shocked” t0

esteem, but this statement in n0

when he made

that

hear that Mr. Davidson allegedly held him in lower

way demonstrates

that

Mr. Davidson was motivated by malice

the earlier written statement. Bliss has failed to provide

whatsoever; therefore, the

district court

wrongful prosecution claim.
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was proper

in granting

any evidence 0f malice

summary judgment on

Bliss’s

MID is Entitled to Immunitv Under I.C. 8 6-904 Absent a Showing 0f Malice

3.

0r Criminal Intent.
In addition to failing to

meet the primafacie

properly dismissed 0n the grounds that

MID is immune from actions

prosecution absent any showing 0f malice 0r criminal intent. Idaho

governmental entity and

its

for wrongﬁJI/malicious

Code

§

6-904 provides that “a

employees while acting within the course and scope of their

employment and Without malice or criminal
arises out

was

case, Bliss’s wrongful prosecution claim

of assault, battery,

false

intent shall not

imprisonment, false

be

arrest,

liable for

any claim Which:

.

.

.

malicious prosecution, abuse 0f

process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” LC. §

6-904(3) (emphasis added).
individually, so

MID

As the

district court points out, Bliss

can only be held liable

if the alleged

has not sued any MID employees

misrepresentations were

made by

employees within the course and scope 0f their employment and if they were made with malice 0r
criminal intent. (R. p. 428). There

is

a rebuttable presumption that employees and board

of MID did not act with malice or criminal

“show some evidence”

that

MID

intent. I.C.

members

§§ 6-903(e); 6-904(3). Thus, Bliss must

employees “acted maliciously or with criminal

intent.” Miller

Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 870, 252 P.3d 1274, 1288 (201

1);

48, 57 P.3d 755, 759 (2002). “Malice here

commission of a wrongful or

unlawful

act,

means

‘the intentional

without legal justiﬁcation or excuse and with

ill

will,

Hunter v.

State,

v.

138 Idaho 44,

whether or not injury was

intended.’” Miller, 150 Idaho at 870, 252 P.3d at 1288 (internal citations omitted). Criminal intent

is

similarly satisﬁed “if it
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is

shown that

the defendant

knowingly performed the proscribed

[criminal] acts.”

Doe

v.

Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) (internal

citations omitted).

Here, as explained in the previous section, Bliss has provided no admissible evidence that

any alleged misrepresentation was made with malice. While Bliss contends

made

Within the written statements 0f the

evidence t0 suggest that any

ill

similarly not demonstrated that any

at

470, 716 P.2d

intent, the district court

employees were

MID employee intentionally made

without legal justiﬁcation 0r with

110 Idaho

MID

at

will. Miller,

150 Idaho

at

incorrect,

that the statements

he has provided n0

a misrepresentation,

let

alone

870, 252 P.3d at 1288. Bliss has

MID employees knowingly performed a criminal act. Durtschi,

1242. Because Bliss failed t0 demonstrate any malice 0r criminal

properly granted

summary judgment on the basis of immunity under I.C.

§

6-904(3). Therefore, the district court’s decision should be upheld.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED BLISS’S CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BECAUSE HE
FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY EXTREME OR OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
BY MID OR ITS EMPLOYEES.
The

district court

distress (“IIED”)

properly dismissed Bliss’s claim for intentional inﬂiction of emotional

based 0n the

fact that

none 0fthe actions or conduct

the record rose t0 the level 0f “atrocious” 0r

430-3 1).

all

possible bounds 0f decency.” (R. pp.

Of note, Bliss has not presented any argument that the district court improperly dismissed

his claim for

that

“beyond

ofMID and its employees 0n

Counts

HED

II

and

for failure t0 ﬁle requisite Notice of Tort

III

contract law and/or

Claim under the ITCA, only arguing

of his Complaint (breach 0f ﬁduciary duty and trespass) are actions under

were sufﬁciently noticed. (Appellant’s
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Brief, pp. 20-3 1). Bliss has

made no

argument as
Bliss has

to

whether his IIED claim satisﬁed notice requirements under the ITCA; therefore,

waived any argument

as to the Viability ofhis

IIED claim and the

district court’s decision

should be upheld.

Even
should

still

if Bliss

had ﬁled sufﬁcient notice for

his

IIED claim, the

district court’s

decision

be upheld because Bliss failed t0 establish aprimafacie case. Under Idaho law, a claim

for intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress has four elements: (1) the conduct

must be extreme and outrageous;

intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct

must be
must be a causal

(3) there

connection between the wrongﬁJI conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional
distress

must be

740 (2003)

severe.

Edmondson

Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 179, 74 P.3d 733,

v.

(internal citations omitted).

emotional distress

by a defendant.

Id.

“Although a

n0 damages are awarded

plaintiff may in fact

in the absence

it

of extreme and outrageous conduct

“Courts have required very extreme conduct before awarding damages for the

intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress.” Id. at 180, 741.

unjustiﬁable,

have suffered extreme

“Even

if a

defendant’s conduct

does not necessarily rise t0 the level of ‘atrocious’ and ‘beyond

of decency’ that would cause an average member 0f the community to believe
Id.

Whether a defendant’s conduct

is

all

it

is

possible bounds

was

extreme and outrageous as t0 warrant recovery

‘outrageous.

is

”’

a matter 0f

law. Id.

Below, Bliss argued that

it

was

“the pressure of getting sufﬁcient water.

..

While also facing

MID pursuing Bliss criminally” that resulted in severe emotional distress, however n0 evidence of
such distress was provided. (R.

p. 430). Bliss’s position

With regard t0 IIED

at

summary judgment

conﬂicted With his position as pled in his original Complaint, wherein he merely asserts that the
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HED was the result of “intentional and reckless

,9 66

misrepresentations” resulting in criminal

charges. (R. pp. 14-15). Bliss again confuses the claim in his

Summary Judgment by

stating that his emotional distress

unrealistic challenges with

[sic]

required t0 d0

MID

by law”.

in trying t0 get

(R. p. 194).

MID

and

its

Bliss

now makes vague

Bliss tries

distress,

0f having “so

many
services

all

possible bounds of decency”.

new factual bases for his IIED claim that were not raised below.
and attempts

to

demean

community without providing any support from

(Appellant’s Brief, p. 44). Bliss alludes t0

MID

board members despite having neither raised

Bliss’s

the record.

allegedly handing out law enforcement records t0

this

With the

a factual allegation in his original Complaint. Bliss

now

district court

below, nor included

also includes the alleged

demonstrate in any

raise these

way how these

arguments for the ﬁrst time on appeal, he

IIED When he alleges

misrepresentations were “outrageous” because
Bliss permission t0

still

distress.

does not

alleged acts are extreme and outrageous.

Lastly, Bliss conﬁJses the standard for

Hunt had given

this as

comments from

Mr. Davidson that “shocked” Bliss as being actionable intentional inﬂictions of emotional

However, not only does Bliss

its

nor has he demonstrated that the actions of

allegations 0f continued harassment

character and standing in the

result

as the district court correctly held, Bliss has

employees were “atrocious” and “beyond

Now, 0n appeal,

was a

in Opposition t0

MID to perform even the most basic

However,

provided n0 evidence that he suffered any

Memorandum

that the alleged

MID either “knew 0r should have known that Mr.

open the head

gate”.

By appealing t0 whether MID “knew 0r

should have known” the truth of its employees” statements, Bliss attempts to apply a negligence
standard t0 his IIED claim. Negligence
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is

not the standard for IIED; rather, intentional 0r reckless

is.

Edmondson, 139 Idaho

by MID or its employees
in dismissing Bliss’s

at 179,

that

74 P.3d

at 740. Bliss

has failed t0 demonstrate any act or conduct

was extreme and outrageous. Therefore,

IIED claim, and

its

the district court

was proper

decision should be upheld.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED BLISS’S CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT BECAUSE HE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE
EXISTANCE OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MID.

VI.

The

district court

properly dismissed Bliss’s breach 0f contract claim because there

evidence of a contract, either express or implied, between Bliss and

MID.

is

n0

A breach of contract is

non-performance of any contractual duty 0f immediate performance. Idaho Power C0.

v.

Cogeneration, Ina, 134 Idaho 738, 746-47, 9 P.3d 1204, 1212-13 (2000) (citing Enterprise, Inc.

Nampa

City,

96 Idaho 734, 740, 536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (quoting

LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 3 12 (1932))).

It is

Id. (citing

122 Idaho 435, 437, 835 P.2d 670, 672 (Ct.App.1992) (quoting
(6th ed. 1990))).

To

prevail

on a claim

RESTATEMENT OF THE

a failure, Without legal excuse, to perform any

promise, Which forms the whole or part 0f a contract.

188

v.

Hughes

v.

Idaho State University,

BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY

for breach of contract a plaintiff must prove

“(21)

the

existence of the contract, (b) the breach 0f the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the

amount 0fthose damages.” Hull v.
Mosell Equities,

LLC v.

Berryhill

Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 774, 331 P.3d 507, 5 16 (2014) (quoting

&

C0,, 154 Idaho 269, 278,

burden 0f proving the existence of a contract and

fact

297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013)). The

of its breach

is

upon the

plaintiff,

and once

those facts are established, the defendant has burden ofpleading and proving afﬁrmative defenses,

Which

legally excuse performance. Id. (citing O’Dell

1082, 1099 (1991)).
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v.

Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P.2d

Here, Bliss presents the same argument as the one he presented below, which the district
court rightfully found unpersuasive.

forth

by

statute. Bliss

As explained

above,

MID’s

duties

and obligations are

mirrors the district court’s decision to the extent that he agrees that

statutory obligations. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 47).

argument stems from a material

misunderstanding of case law regarding implied contracts through past conduct. Bliss

LLC v.

understanding.”

parties.

Id. (citing

is

a true contract

Such a contract

Kennedy

Bliss takes “conduct” in this rule to

obligations.

v.

the parties, primarily past conduct

v.

is

Whose existence and terms

grounded in the

parties’

are inferred

agreement and

tacit

Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997)).

mean

“appropriate course 0f conduct” under statutory

However, the conduct considered

Contractors Assn.

cites

Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 508, 415 P.3d 372, 376 (2018), Which

provides “[a] contract implied-in-fact

from the conduct 0f the

MID has

However, Bliss inexplicably conﬂates the

statutory duties into an alleged implied contract. Bliss’s

Medical Recovery Servs,

set

for implied-in-fact contracts

is

the conduct between

which would evince an agreement. North Idaho Building

City ofHayden, 164 Idaho 530, 543, 432 P.3d 976, 989 (2018).

Bliss has failed to demonstrate the existence of a contract implied-in-fact for three reasons.

First, Bliss

has not pled the existence of any conduct or agreement to support a contract

implied-in-fact Within his original Complaint. Second, Bliss has not provided any evidence of

conduct between

MID

and himself that would evince the existence of an agreement. The only

obligations alleged in this case are products of statutory law, not

MID

and

Bliss. Lastly, Bliss has

provided n0 evidence of MID having an agreement With him.

Bliss identiﬁes obligations under statute, but does not provide
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some implied agreement between

any evidence

to

even suggest that

MID has made
record

is

implied.

an agreement with Bliss speciﬁcally t0 carry out

entirely bereft

As

VII.

its

statutory obligations.

The

0f any evidence 0f a contract between Bliss and MID, whether express or

such, the district court

contract claim, and

its

was proper

in granting

summary judgment 0n Bliss’s breach of

decision should be upheld.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BLISS’S CLAIM FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF BECAUSE HE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY
ACTUAL OR THREATENED INJURY AND BECAUSE HE HAD A DUTY TO
REMOVE NOXIOUS WEEDS FROM HIS OWN PROPERTY.
Bliss’s claim for declaratory reliefwas properly dismissed for being needlessly duplicative

causes 0f action

when he could

allegations regarding

any

already avail himself t0 remedies in

acts 0r omissions

by MID 0r its employees

tort.

Bliss has not

as to state a claim

made any
upon which

declaratory relief can be granted. Declaratory judgments and requests for declaratory relief under

Idaho law are governed by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, codiﬁed under Idaho Code §
10-1201, et seq.

T0 warrant

grant of declaratory relief, there must be a real and substantial

controversy admitting 0f speciﬁc relief through a conclusive decree rather than through a merely

advisory opinion as to what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts, and the

danger must be present. See Wylie

As

v.

State,

such, a declaratory judgment action

Irrigation District, 162 Idaho 866, 869,

plaintiff‘s

Idaho Transp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 151 Idaho 26 (201

must involve a justiciable controversy. Paslay

v.

1).

A&B

406 P.3d 878, 881 (2017).

“Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based federal justiciability standard.” Id (quoting

Davidson

v.

Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006)). Standing

element 0f a justiciable claim. Van Valkenburgh
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v.

is

an essential

Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 125,

15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Standing requires (1) a distinct injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable t0 the

conduct from Which a plaintiff seeks
Will

relief,

remedy or prevent the injury. Lujan

v.

119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Coalfor Agric.
920, 924 (2016); Schneider

may be predicated upon

v.

and

(3) a substantial likelihood that the requested relief

Deﬁsn 0f Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
's

Future

v.

Canyon

a threatened

harm

standing

is

Arambarri

v.

v.

369 P.3d

(2006). “Standing

v.

Cassia

However, the injury must be “actual or

State,

162 Idahol

1,

19,

394 P.3d 54, 62

Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 187, 194 (2015)). Since

jurisdictional,

v.

Cnty., 160 Idaho 142, 146,

as well as a past injury.” Id. (citing Harris

imminent, not conjectural 0r hypothetical.” Tucker

S.Ct. 2 1 30,

,

Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237

Cnly., 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984)).

(quoting State

560—6 1 112

it

can be raised

at

any time, and the Court has a duty t0

raise

it

sua sponte.

Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012) (citations omitted).

Bliss’s claim for declaratory relief is not justiciable because

rights or status at issue that are actually in controversy.

he has failed to allege any

Within his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the

following rights: (1) access to adequate water for his crops; (2) requirements for water
deliverability; (3) control

0f noxious weeds; and (4) director meetings open to the public. However,

as the district court correctly determined, these are not justiciable causes 0f action.

Bliss’s access to adequate water

and water

deliverability, the duties

concerning delivery and distribution 0f water rights

Code.

Any

failure

by

MID to meet its

434; Skinner, 159 Idaho
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647

).

is

Regarding

and responsibilities

MID has

governed by Title 43, Chapter 3 0f the Idaho

statutory obligations

is

enforceable under tort law. (R. p.

Regarding the control of noxious weeds, both Bliss and

MID have a statutory duty to

control noxious weeds. LC. §§ 22-2402(13), 22-2407. Because the rights and obligations

concerning the control of noxious weeds are
relief from a court,

n0 need

for declaratory

and thus n0 justiciable controversy.

Lastly, regarding

district court’s

set forth in statutes, there is

ﬁnding

open meetings, Bliss

that Bliss has ever

still

has not provided any evidence t0 overcome the

been prevented from attending such meetings. Where

Bliss has not demonstrated ever being denied access to public meetings, there

controversy regarding his access to warrant declaratory

relief.

Therefore the

is

no justiciable

district court’s

decision t0 dismiss Bliss’s claims for declaratory relief should be upheld.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
MID

should be granted attorney fees 0n appeal pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 54(6), and Idaho Code

§§ 12-1 17, 12- 121, and 6-9 1 8A, as this

is

an action under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Idaho Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) permits a court to

award fees

to the prevailing party

when provided for by

statute.

Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) provides for an award of attorney fees under

12-121

when

ﬁnds

the court

that the case

was brought, pursued 0r defended

I.C. §

frivolously,

unreasonably or without foundation. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 permits awards of fees on appeal

When otherwise permitted by rule,

may be awarded attorney fees

contract, 0r statute.

against a plaintiff Who

conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.

purpose.” Cordova

v.

was

guilty

faith is

§

6-918A, a governmental entity

ofbad faith in the commencement,

deﬁned

as dishonesty in belief or

Bonneville Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. N0. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774,

780 (2007) (quoting Cobbzey

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

“Bad

Under LC.

—

39

v.

Cizy

ofChams, 143 Idaho

130, 135, 139 P.3d 732, 737 (2006)).

Section 12-1 17 provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees

Whom the judgment is rendered acted Without a reasonable basis
demonstrates an appeal

is

deemed

frivolous

the district court misapplied the law.

(1

Bowles

When
v.

a party fails to

Pro

when

“the party against

in fact or law.”

make

Case law

a legitimate showing that

Indiviso, Ina, 132 Idaho 371,

973 P.2d 142

999).

Here,

MID

should be granted attorney fees because

appeal 0n the district court’s appropriate order granting

it

was forced

to

defend a frivolous

summary judgment.

Bliss brought the

immediate action and subsequent appeal frivolously by ﬁling a Complaint Without satisfying the
notice requirements of LC. § 6-906. Bliss failed to

make any

legitimate

court misapplied the law. Rather than correct the district court

the

showing

that the district

0n the law, Bliss merely rehashed

same arguments he made below or provided new arguments never presented before

the district

court.

Bliss acted with dishonesty in belief or purpose

amounting

to

bad

faith in bringing this

appeal because, as indicated, Bliss had n0 evidentiary basis t0 support this appeal. Bliss did not

produce any additional evidence beyond that Which was presented t0 the
evidence which the

district court

district court

below —

found entirely unpersuasive. As such, because Bliss knew he did

not have enough evidence to demonstrate any 0f his claims, he acted in bad faith by ﬁling this
appeal. Bliss’s appeal

is

entirely Without reasonable basis in

and costs on appeal should be granted.
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law 0r

fact.

Therefore, attorney fees

CONCLUSION
Based 0n the foregoing, Minidoka
uphold the

Irrigation District respectfully requests that this Court

district court’s decision to grant its

claims in their entirety. Additionally, because

brought and maintained in bad

awarded attorney
Dated

fees

this 26th
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day of June, 2019.
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it

Minidoka

and costs 0n appeal.

—

Motion

for

Summary Judgment and dismiss

was forced

to

Bliss’s

defend against a frivolous appeal

Irrigation District respectﬁllly requests that

it

be
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